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Recently, Martin Luther and the Lutheran Reformation has received heavy 
criticism in various theological and philosophical circles. In many scholarly 
treatments of the history of western philosophy and culture, Reformation has 
been treated as one step on a trajectory from nominalist revolution to liberal 
Protestantism, atheistic secular modernism, and relativist postmodernism. 
The Reformers not only created a schism within the church, but they brought 
forth all the horrors of the modern age. Instead of providing a cure for the 
spiritual crisis of late medieval theology, they gave birth to a horrible 
epidemic. 
 
To quote a few examples: Charles Taylor sees the Reformation as an agent of 
disenchantment with reality, which casts out the sacred from the world, and 
creates a dichotomy between the public secular reality and more private 
spiritual sphere.1 Louis Dupré suggests that the Reformers were unable to 
escape the grip nominalist dualism where the nature and grace inhabited 
totally different spheres of reality. This affected ideas about the complete 
depravity of human nature and forensic justification, which ultimately left 
nature (and reason) unhealed.2  
 
In similar vein, Michael Allen Gillespie sees Reformation’s indebtedness to 
nominalism as the primary reason for a dualistic world where the faith and 
reason, church and society, Christians and pagans are separated and pitted 
against each other — with violent consequences.3 John Milbank has made 
similar claims.4 In his famous Regensburg address, Pope Benedict XVI claims: 
 
Dehellenization first emerges in connection with the postulates of the 
Reformation in the sixteenth century. Looking at the tradition of 
scholastic theology, the Reformers thought they were confronted 
with a faith system totally conditioned by philosophy, that is to say, 
an articulation of the faith based on an alien system of thought. As a 
                                                             
1 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Belknap, 2007), 79, 733. 
2 Louis Dupré, Religion and the Rise of Modern Culture, (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press 2008), 22–23. 
3 Michael Allen Gillespie, The Theological Origins of Modernity (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2008), 101–169. 
4 See, e.g., John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 9. See 
also his ‘Knowledge: The Theological Critique of Philosophy in Hamann and Jacobi’ 
in Radical Orthodoxy, eds. John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock and Graham Ward 
(London: Routledge, 1999): 23. 
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result, faith no longer appeared as a living historical Word but as one 
element of an overarching philosophical system. The principle of sola 
scriptura, on the other hand, sought faith in its pure, primordial form, 
as originally found in the biblical Word. Metaphysics appeared as a 
premise derived from another source, from which faith had to be 
liberated in order to become once more fully itself. When Kant stated 
that he needed to set thinking aside in order to make room for faith, 
he carried this programme forward with a radicalism that the 
Reformers could never have foreseen. He thus anchored faith 
exclusively in practical reason, denying it access to reality as a 
whole.5  
 
Even Richard Dawkins wants to have a piece of Luther! Dawkins uses Luther 
as an example of religious anti-rationalism in his The God Delusion.6 All in all, 
Luther’s thinking is perceived as enforcing the ideas of individualism, 
fideism, and relativism that are commonly labeled as “postmodern.” How 
should we think about such claims? 
 
I begin with a very postmodern key, that is, by denying definite meanings of 
the concepts in my title. There is no such a thing as postmodern philosophy 
and there is no such a thing as Lutheran theology. By this denial, I mean to 
underline the nebulous nature of human institutions, movements, and 
thought patterns. 
 
However, this move, also known as anti-essentialism, can have various 
degrees. I do not intend to say that we can label almost anything (or nothing) 
as postmodern or Lutheran. Postmodernists often take each other to task 
regarding the very nature of their way of thinking, and even more so, 
Lutherans are well-known for their eagerness to play king of the hill: who is 
the one that represents the genuine form of Lutheranism.7  
 
Despite this vagueness, people generally are quite reliable in recognizing 
things either as postmodern or Lutheran. This is due to some general 
characteristics that these things often have. In the following, I have (in good 
Lutheran fashion) formulated some theses. The theses are split between the 
philosophical and the theological so that philosophical theses portray some 
broadly understood postmodern attitudes regarding various philosophical 
topics. 
 
Then I will present the same theses with a theological twist so that they 
correlate with, again broadly understood, Lutheran sensibilities.8 I will offer a 
                                                             
5 Benedict XVI, Faith, Reason and the University. Memories and 
Reflections (2006). www.vatican.va (accessed 1 August 2010). 
6 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (New York: Bantam, 2006), 190. 
7 Because the both movements are so hard to pin down, I need to take a risk of 
oversimplifying and doing some interpretative violence to both of them. 
Nevertheless, I try to consider nuances as much as possible. 
8 Lutheran theology, or Luther’s theology to be exact, and postmodernism are 
sometimes coupled in ways that are not totally satisfactory. For example, Carl 
Raschke (The Next Reformation. Why Evangelicals Must Embrace Postmodernity (Grand 
Rapids: Baker, 2004), 208-209) claims that Luther “would have been regarded as a 
postmodernist by the standards of his day”. The claim is surrounded by sound bites 
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short commentary of each topic and then make a few distinctions where the 
general sensibilities of postmodernism and Lutheranism, in my view, differ 






1. On language: Our understanding of the world is deeply dependent on 
language. 
2. On metaphysics: There cannot be a neutral form of metaphysics that could 
serve as a starting point for rational enquiry. 
3. On method: There is no a priori method that can help us in our enquiry. 
4. On epistemology: Claims of truth and knowledge are viewed with suspicion. 
5. On ethics: One should try to guide his or her actions so that they serve 
liberation. 
6. On forgiveness: Forgiveness should be unconditional and free from all 




7. On language: the signified contains always something more that can be 
expressed by the means of language. In theological language, the signified is 
made present through the sign. 
8. On metaphysics: The subject of theology cannot appropriately be approached 
through neutral metaphysics. Metaphysical models should be construed on 
the basis of salvation history. 
9. On method: Theological method should not be decided a priori but based on 
the subject matter. 
10. On epistemology: Human reason is both severely limited and tainted by sin. 
Theological knowledge is based on God’s self-revelation, not in human 
achievement. 
11. On ethics: The Golden rule and the Decalogue form the basis of ethical 
deliberation. Hierarchies can serve both good and bad ends. 
12. On forgiveness: The aim of forgiveness is to establish a loving connection 






If there is one central postmodern thesis, it is this one about language: 
Language exists between the world and us. Depending on the thinker, the 
                                                             
of which many are either historically false or misleading. For books that investigate 
the relation of Lutheran theology and postmodern philosophy in a more detail and 
from various angles, see e.g., Timothy Stanley, Protestant Metaphysics after Karl Barth 
and Martin Heidegger (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2010); Paul R. Hinlicky, Paths not Taken. 
Fates of Theology from Luther through Leibniz (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009); Brad 
Gregory, The Unintended Reformation. How Religious Revolution Secularized 
Society (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2012); Jennifer Hockenbery Dragseth, 
ed, The Devil’s Whore. Reason and Philosophy in the Lutheran Tradition (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 2011). 
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thesis can be viewed in a strong or weak sense. In the former sense, it means 
that language hides the reality from us and prevents us from ever actually 
reaching it. We never get to things themselves and our dealings are always 
with words, which do not have fixed meanings. The weaker sense admits the 
mediating nature of language but does not see this as something that blocks 
our access to reality; instead it is language that grants us the access, or it gives 
us the reality.9  
 
Now, it is easy to see how these ideas might overlap with Lutheran theology. 
Lutheran theology has traditionally been perceived as a theology that is very 
much interested in words.10 In Luther’s own theology, we see special interest 
towards words and their metaphysical nature. 
 
Namely, for Luther, theology starts with words and proceeds to metaphysics 
through language and historical events. The debate with theologians of 
Zwinglian bent demonstrated this clearly. For Zwinglians, the rules of logic 
and philosophical metaphysics were taken in a priori so that they would 
function as the norm for what reality is truly like; instead Luther wanted to 
start with the events and linguistic accounts of those events and form the 
philosophy so that it portrayed the essence of these events. Luther could go to 
extremes when defending this basic rule. 
 
For example, his famous utterance about reason (Vernunft) as “the devil’s 
whore” took place in the context of arguing against Karlstadt who wanted to 
hold on to the rule of praedicatio identica and which kept him from affirming 
the real presence of Christ’s body in the Eucharist.11 Obviously, Luther’s basic 
point about language has some affinity with some postmodern sensibilities, 
especially those who wish to underline language as a way to access the 
world.12  
 
However, there is a clear dissimilarity between Luther and even the weaker 
forms of postmodern thought on language. The difference lies in the way 
signification works in theological language compared to philosophy. Luther 
thinks that theological language makes present the things that are being 
referred in a special way.13 Therefore Christian faith and secular reason use 
and understand the nature of certain concepts in different ways. 
 
                                                             
9 James K.A. Smith, Jacques Derrida. Live Theory (London: Continuum, 2005), 16–46. 
10 Robert W. Jenson, Systematic Theology. Vol 2. The Works of God (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 270–289. This can be seen in earliest systematic expositions of 
Lutheran thought, from Melanchthon’s Loci Communes to much larger and later Loci. 
The loci-method proceeds from the basic biblical concepts, such as sin, grace, and 
baptism offering a canonical interpretation of these concepts. In this perhaps a bit 
technical way, the basic ingredient of Lutheran theology is the word as a concept in 
its canonical context. 
11 WA 18, 164. See Theodor Dieter, “Martin Luther’s Understanding of 
“Reason”,” Lutheran Quarterly XXV (2011), 249–278. 
12 For a similar account, see James K.A. Smith, Speech and Theology (London: 
Routledge, 2002). 
13 Some postmodernists (Derrida, among others) like to argue that the meaning of 
the concepts is deferred endlessly so that we can never give exact account of what 
they are about. 
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In the normal philosophical use, concepts refer to absent objects, but in 
theology the concepts contain the essence to which they refer. Therefore, 
Luther insists on the real presence of Christ in the bread and wine as opposed 
to idealist and docetic interpretations because here especially the words “hoc 
est” indicate a special mode of presence.14  
 
Secular philosophy (by which Luther means the way language is normally 
used in everyday contexts) cannot handle this kind of predication. In keeping 
with this, the same concepts used in philosophy and theology have their own 
meanings and uses within their respective spheres.15  
 
This does not mean that the significance of the words in theology and 
philosophy are totally disconnected. Instead there is always a common 
signification between theological and philosophical use. When a concept of 
ordinary language is transferred to the theological realm, it goes through 
“metaphorical extension.” On the one hand, the meaning changes but on the 
other hand, it remains constant. 
 
In the case of “A Mighty Fortress is our God,” the words “mighty fortress” 
have, to some extent, same meaning when used to refer to an actual fortress 
and God, but in the case of God, the meaning is extended. There is no radical 
break but rather a stretching of the meaning. The addition, however, cannot 
be figured out without revelation. By looking at a fortress, we do not come to 





Postmodernists typically claim that metaphysics is violent. This claim relates 
to the thesis on language. Human concepts (and metaphysics is done with the 
help of concepts) can never depict reality as it is; therefore, any attempt to 
define reality with the help of words must be an arrogant act. 
 
Furthermore, speaking about God effectively means taking God captive. This 
claim is typically coupled with an accusation of “onto-theological error”: 
using the word “to be” (esse) in the same way of God and creatures. This, 
according to critics, makes God a being and a member of created order (even 
if the greatest being of all beings).17  
 
There are, however, ways within postmodern philosophy to allow one to 
speak about metaphysics, but often this is just a way of referring to not-world, 
                                                             
14 See especially Luther’s Vom Abendmahl Christi, Bekenntnis (1528). 
15 WA 39 I: 231, 1–3. “Secular” words must be cleansed or “baptized” in order to be 
used in theology. See also WA 39 I: 229, 16–19. 
16 Dennis Bielfeld, “Luther on language”, Lutheran Quarterly 16 no. 2 (2002): 210. 
17 For discussion, see D. Stephen Long, Speaking of God. Theology, Language and 
Truth (Grands Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), See also Marilyn McCord Adams’s 
refutation of general claims of onto-theology:  “What Wrong With the 
Ontotheological Error?”, Journal of Analytic Theology 2 (2014), 1–12. 
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of which we can speak only be denying that it is something ultimately 
different from the world.18  
 
Lutheran theologians, since Luther himself, have been suspicious of grand 
metaphysical projects. Already in The Heidelberg Disputation (1519), Luther 
launches a critique of metaphysical theology that tries to climb a ladder from 
this world to transcendence: “That person does not deserve to be called a 
theologian who looks upon the invisible things of God as though they were 
clearly perceptible in those things which have actually happened [Rom. 
1.20].” Luther’s “Theology of the Cross” is often seen as a critique of 
metaphysics but this is clearly an overstatement.19 Instead, Luther offers a 
critique of particular kind of metaphysics that does not proceed from a 
properly Biblical basis (this was already discussed in relation to language). 
 
This enterprise was intensified in later Lutheran generations, especially after 
Kant.20 Someone could even claim that Lutheranism produced postmodern 
philosophy or at least created a seed-bed where it could grow.21 These claims 
are, to some extent, warranted although Luther and other magisterial 
reformers would quite likely abhor many things that are attributed to them. 
Even if there has been an anti-metaphysical trend in Lutheran theology and 
Luther scholarship, I take that this turn to be ultimately a wrong one. 
 
Luther’s criticism of a particular use of certain metaphysical traditions cannot 
be taken as a wholesale rejection of metaphysics but as a call to do 
metaphysics in a better way.22  
 
However, as one can imagine this issue is not a simple one. To a great extent, 
the discussion has shifted from Luther to Karl Barth’s legacy (and his relation 





                                                             
18 This is the case of Heidegger and his followers. S.J. McGrath, Heidegger. A (Very) 
Critical Introduction(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 103; David Bentley Hart, 
“Philosopher in the Twilight”, First Things 210 (2/2011) 44–51. 
19 Kari Kopperi, “Theology of the Cross”, in Engaging Luther, ed. by Olli-Pekka 
Vainio (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2011), 155–172. 
20 Risto Saarinen, Gotter Wirken Auf Uns. Die Transzendentale Deutung des Gegenwart-
Christi-Motivs in der Lutherforschung (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1989). 
21 Thus, e.g., Gregory, Unintended Reformation; Benedictus XVI, “Faith, Reason and 
the University. Memories and Reflections”. (online: www.vatican.va). 
22 Erwin Metzke, Sakrament und Metaphysik. Eine Lutherstudie über das Verhältnis des 
christlichen Denkens zum Leiblich-Materiell (Kreuz: Stuttgart, 1948). 
23 For a good account, see Philip Cary, “Barth Wars”, First Things, March 2015; 
Thomas White, “Introduction: Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth – An Unofficial 
Catholic-Protestant Dialogue”, in Bruce L. McCormack & Thomas Joseph White, O.P. 
(eds.), Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth. An Unofficial Catholic-Protestant Dialogue. 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013), 1-42. See also Adrian Pabst, Metaphysics. The 
Creation of Hierarchy (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011); David Bentley Hart, “The 
Offering of Names: Metaphysics, Nihilism, and Analogy” in Reason and the Reason of 
Faith, Eds. Paul J. Griffiths and Reinhard Hütter (New York: Continuum, 2005), 256. 
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Methodical anarchism is typical for postmodern thinkers. For example, Paul 
Feyerabend has argued against any universal rules that should be observed in 
scientific inquiry for (at least) two reasons. First, no one has been able to come 
up with these rules and, second, settling oneself with a particular set of rules 
would stifle the progress of science.24  
 
Feyerabend’s anarchistic approach can be seen as a form of anti-positivism 
and anti-modernism. Postmodern theologians have typical embraced these 
proposals because this new climate allows theologians to pursue their own 
projects without the need to pay homage to scientists and one particular 
scientific method.25  
 
A moderate form of anti-modern turn in science is critical realism. Critical 
realists acknowledge the perspectival nature of knowledge, but they do not 
abandon the pursuit of knowledge and truth. Our knowledge of the world is 
always deficient, but it can get better little by little. Also, critical realists see 
the world as stratified, which results in methodological pluralism. For 
example, a tumor can have chemical, physical, sociological, psychological and 
theological effects in the human person. Employing just one method to 
understand what the tumor is would give us very thin view of the 
phenomenon. 
 
The development of Lutheran theological method can be seen in relation to 
the medieval and late medieval development in theology. Since the rise of 
Aristotelianism in the 12th century there had been an on-going debate on the 
scientific nature of theology.26 Simply put, Dominicans wanted to interpret 
theology as theoretical science, whereas Franciscans wanted to see theology 
as a practical science. 
 
If in theoretical science one attempted to form true propositions with the help 
of syllogisms and proofs, in practical science the goal of knowledge was the 
correct conduct that helped to achieve the optimal form of human behavior. It 
is obvious that Luther was drawn towards the Franciscan form of doing 
theology.27 This practical emphasis becomes apparent in Luther’s pastoral 




                                                             
24 Paul Feyerabend, Against Method (New York: Verso, 2010). 
25 Thus, e.g., Jenson, Systematic Theology. Vol 2, 277; Stanley J. Grenz, Renewing the 
Center. Evangelical Theology in a Post-Theological Era (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 
192–225. 
26 Ulrich G. Leinsle, Introduction to Scholastic Theology (Washington DC: Catholic 
University of America Press, 2010); Robert D. Preus, The Theology of Post-Reformation 
Lutheranism Vol. I (St. Louis: Concordia, 1970), 202-203. 
27 Heiko A. Oberman, “Luther and the Via Moderna: The Philosophical Backdrop of 
the Reformation Breakthrough”, The Journal of Ecclesiastical History 54, no. 4. (October 
2003): 641–70. In Lutheran scholasticism, the same questions were re-introduced in 
the form of debate between analytic and synthetic method in theology. Preus, The 
Theology of Post-Reformation Lutheranism, 44–47. 
28 I do not mean that Luther does not have a philosophical bone in his body since he 
clearly engaged in deeply philosophical disputes during his career. But even in these 
disputes he sides with the practical ideals of science. 
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Postmodern thinking is generally suspicious against post-Enlightenment 
epistemological projects, which aim to achieve objective knowledge. 
Postmoderns typically deny the possibility of having neutral “God’s point of 
view” or “a view from nowhere” to things. Instead, our knowledge is 
perspectival; if we perceive x, we perceive x always from a particular angle. 
Moreover, we perceive things as they are going through change.29  
 
Lutherans have generally been suspicious toward natural theology since it 
has seen as a suspect attempt to rely on earthly wisdom, instead the wisdom 
of the cross. The knowledge of God cannot be attained through philosophical 
argument based on nature but only through God’s own self-giving and self-
revelation.30  
 
Luther thinks that reason is no longer pure, but tainted by sin and 
concupiscence. Therefore, it can lead people astray. In this context, Luther 
distinguishes between reason and wisdom. Human beings can use their 
reason even in a state of corruption, but lack of wisdom means that reason 
can be used for evil purposes. The more the subject matter has to do with 
efficient and final causes, the more likely the absence of wisdom will have 
negative effects on reasoning.31  
 
Luther understands reason in at least three different contexts.32 First, there is 
corrupted reason, which produces all kinds of evil. This reason is tainted with 
lust and a love of wrong things, so that it gives impure impulses to the will, 
making what is in fact immoral seem good and right. Second, there is natural 
or philosophical reason, which can detect at least some of the basic principles 
correctly, being virtually untouched by the Fall. 
 
Without outside help, reason can know that God exists, that he is the creator 
of the world, all-powerful, and perfect in every way, that he is just, and that 
he is good. In addition, even corrupt people can have at least some 
knowledge of natural law. However, when philosophical reason looks at the 
central Christian claims, it does not know how to interpret them.33  
                                                             
29 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals. Transl. by Ian Johnston. Arlington, 
VA: Richer Resources, 2010),  III, 12. 
30 See, e.g., Jenson, Systematic Theology. Vol 2, 153-155; Paul R. Hinlicky, Divine 
Complexity. The Rise of Creedal Christianity (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 1-2. 
31 See especially Luther’s Disputatio De Homine, where he claims that unaided natural 
reason functions well when it reasons about material causes (of human being), starts 
to falter with formal causes and is completely clueless about efficient and final 
causes. 
32 Theodor Dieter, “Martin Luther’s Understanding of “Reason”,” Lutheran 
Quarterly XXV (2011), 249–278; Denis Janz, “Whore or Handmaid? Luther and 
Aquinas on the Function of Reason in Theology,” in The Devil’s Whore. Reason and 
Philosophy in the Lutheran Tradition, ed. by Jennifer Hockenberry Dragseth 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2011), 47–52; Bruce Marshall, “Faith and Reason 
Reconsidered: Aquinas and Luther on Deciding What Is True,” The Thomist 63 No. 1 
(Jan. 1999), 1–49; Roland Chia, “Protestant Reflections on Pope Benedict XVI’s Faith, 
Reason and the University,” Dialog 46 No. 1. (Spring 2007), 66-77. 
33 Jerry K. Robbins, ‘Luther on Reason: A Reappraisal’, Word & World XIII no. 2. 
(Spring 1993): 197. Luther on proofs of God’s existence, see Siegbert W. 
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Third, there is purified reason, which is joined with faith and is thus able to 
produce accurate conclusions about the origins and telos of creation.34 When 
Luther says that reason and philosophy cannot help theology in any way, and 
can even be disastrous to it, he clearly uses the word in the first sense. 
 
The point where Luther diverges from postmodern masters of suspicion is in 
the topic of certainty.35 A Christian needs to be sure about his or her status 
before God. In his Commentary on Galatians Luther even suggests that the 
believer should know himself as God knows him.36  
 
In The Bondage of the Will, he insists, “If you remove the certain assertion, you 
destroy the Christian Faith. The Holy Spirit is no skeptic, and it is not doubts 
and opinions that he has written on our hearts but assertions more sure and 
certain than life itself and all experience.”37 However, the certainty that 
Luther speaks about here is no ordinary certainty that is linked to worldly 
knowledge. Theological certainty is even more certain than any knowledge 
about the things of this world because it is revealed to the believer by all-





At the center of postmodern ethical thinking is suspicion against hierarchies 
and structures of power.38 More precisely, it is the concern for justice and the 
fate of “excluded other” that concerns postmodern theorists the most. 
Surprisingly, it is possible for systems of justice to become oppressive, and 
this is where Derrida, amongst others, sticks his finger.  Derrida argues that 
our concept of justice is necessarily limited and the worst results are often 
harvested when people think that they know what is just but they act only 
based on very limited sense of justice.39 Furthermore, it is also typical for 
postmodernists to attempt to uncover hidden intentions and motives behind 
outward actions. 
 
Moreover, postmodern ethics is oriented towards action, or practice, that 
seeks to change things for the better. Postmodernists often reduce religion to 
ethics, for example, John Caputo claims: “Religion is ethics; it is doing your 
                                                             
Becker, Foolishness of God. Place of Reason in the theology of Martin Luther (Milwaukee: 
Nortwestern Publishing House 1999), 24–36. 
34 WATr 3, 105, 2938: “Before we come to faith and the knowledge of God, our 
reason is darkness; in the believer, however, it is a most useful tool… Faith then is 
aided by reason, rhetoric, and language which were such great obstacles before we 
had faith. Enlightened Reason which is incorporated into faith receives gift from 
faith. …Reason in godly men is something different since it does not fight with faith 
but rather aids it.” 
35 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology Vol 3 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), 
162-166. 
36 WA 40 I, 650, 21-32. 
37 LW 33:24. 
38 See, e.g., Simon Critchley, Continental Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 73–74. 
39 Smith, Jacques Derrida, 65–68.  Derrida’s claim “deconstruction is justice” means 
effectively weakening our trust on our judgments of justice. 
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duty where the voice of duty or conscience is taken as the voice of 
God.”40 Ethical duties are typically directed towards “the Other”, who present 
us an obligation of unconditional and absolute demand of hospitality and 
love.41  
 
The Lutheran Reformation is often depicted as a movement from captivity to 
freedom. Obviously, this was also Luther’s own interpretation. For example, 
he started to sign his letters as “Eleutherius” (Greek eleutheros, free) soon after 
he had nailed the 95 theses on the Wittenberg church door, and he used the 
title of one his most famous books (De Captivitate Babylonica Ecclesiae, 1520) to 
underscore the true nature of his previous masters. 
 
However, freedom has always been a problem for Lutherans. The peasants 
and radical reformers thought that freedom is indeed good and it must be 
achieved by any means necessary, which Luther abhorred. As is often the case 
with reformers, they set the train in motion but they are unable to make it 
stop at their desired destination as it gains more speed. 
 
Among others, Reinhard Hütter and David Yeago have examined in detail 
the problem of freedom in the Lutheran theology.42 According to Hütter’s 
analysis, the post-Reformation Lutheran theology has been sliding towards 
notions of abstract, or formless, freedom where almost anything goes as long 
as it fulfils some vague notion of the good. In effect, this means that Lutheran 
ethics is reduced to general rules without particular definition.43  
 
Golden rule appears often as the summa of Lutheran thinking but as such it is 
vacuous: Am I really in the positions to assess what is my neighbor’s best? 
Aren’t our intentions and inclinations tainted by sin? How can they serve as 
the norm for the good? If this reduced version truly is what Lutheran ethics is 
about then there is very little that sets it apart from postmodern theorization, 
                                                             
40 Caputo, Philosophy and Theology, 32. See also his, What Would Jesus Deconstruct? The 
Good News of Postmodernism for the Church (Grand Rapids, Baker, 2007). 
41 Smith, Jacques Derrida, 76–79. It is perhaps worthwhile to point out one of the 
foundational ironies of postmodern thought. Postmodernism attempts to offer a safe 
space for every identity, and to reach this goal it draws heavily from philosophical 
anti-realism that has been favoured by several thinkers on the Left. However, anti-
realism gives you very thin concept of persons, which is inadequate for robust 
ethical theorization. Even more puzzling is that it is nowadays often the Liberal 
Right that seeks to safeguard this goal, not the Left. Christopher Butler argues that 
postmodernists have been very effective in pointing out the problems in 
contemporary society but so far there have been very few constructive proposals 
how we should live after the old ways of thinking have been cast out. Often, in 
Butler’s mind, it seems that postmodernism is a form of “passive conservatism”: it 
just hopes that some forms of classical humanism will survive the end of 
metaphysics, and the person. Christopher Butler, Postmodernism. A very short 
introduction. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002.) See also John Haldane, 
“Rational and other animals”, in John Haldane, Reasonable Faith(London: Routledge, 
2010), 120–128. 
42 Reinhard Hütter, Bound to be Free (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 111-184; David 
Yeago, “Gnosticism, Antinomianism, and Reformation Theology. Reflections on the 
Costs of a Construal”, Pro Ecclesia Vol. II, No. 1. (1993), 37–49. 
43 See also Robert Benne, “Lutheran Ethics: Perennial Themes and Contemporary 
Challenges”, in Karen L. Bloomqvist & John R. Stumme, eds., The Promise of Lutheran 
Ethics (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1998), 11-30. 
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where individual autonomy and the independence of ethical subject are the 
supreme norm. 
 
However, this reduced view is hard to bring in line with Luther’s thought. 
For him, general rules are always given form through particular 
commandments, specifically in the form of the Decalogue and the 
commandments included in the New Testament canon.44 Lutherans do not 
think that hierarchies are necessarily bad as some of them are divinely 
instituted. For example, Lutherans think that the ordained ministry is 
divinely instituted and not just a contingent way of organizing ecclesial life. 
 
Luther’s theology has two well-known special principles that have a 
hierarchical function. The Two Kingdoms doctrine was originally supposed 
to give the church its own space and set it out of reach of secular rulers.45 The 
Three Estates (Church, household, state) set in similar fashion these three 
spheres apart from each other, and also in hierarchical order. The Church is 
the highest and it existed already in paradise. The household is a part of the 
good, original creation as well, but the state is needed only after the Fall to 
limit the evil inclinations of human beings.46  
 
The Lutheran Book of Concord lays out the basic rules on how to the live with 
secular hierarchies (e.g. CA, XVI). The possibility to resist rulers remains but 
the conditions of revolt are clearly outlined. The rulers need to be obeyed as 
long as they do not ask one to commit sins. Lutherans also subscribe to the 
just war practice.47  
 
Finally, it must be noted that Lutheran theology and postmodern philosophy 
share a common emphasis on practice (praxis).48 This is perhaps best seen in 
George Lindbeck’s construal of the nature of doctrine as a cultural-linguistic 
practice that is not just mere reproduction of propositional content or mere 
                                                             
44 In his Catechisms, Luther sets the Decalogue as the central element for daily 
mediation. See also WA 16, 431, 14ff; WA 39/1 47, 25–36. 
45 It is well-known that the doctrine became corrupted over the years and partly 
enabled the horrid events in the early 20th century Germany, when German 
Christians interpreted it so that God has a way of ruling the world through earthly 
rulers and Christians should obey them. This effectively led to a very nationalistic 
form of religiosity where it became increasingly difficult to criticise the earthly rulers 
(this idea was still a part of the original doctrine). Arne Rasmusson, “Historiography 
and Theology. Theology in the Weimar Republic and the Beginning of the Third 
Reich,” Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte 20:1 (2007): 155–180. 
46 Oswald Bayer argues that the Estates are actually more important for Luther than 
the Two Kingdoms principle and paying more attention to how estates are 
structured would prevent one from making too simplistic categorizations (e.g., 
splitting the world between religious and secular spheres). Oswald Bayer, Martin 
Luther’s Theology. A Contemporary Interpretation (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 122–
126. 
47 WA 39 II, 40. (Die Zirkulardisputation über das Recht des Widerstand des gegen 
den Kaiser (Mt. 19, 21)). For a critical view of Luther’s political theology, see Andrew 
Bradstock, “The Reformation”, in Peter Scott & William T. Cavanaugh, eds, The 
Blackwell Compation to Political Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 62-66. 
48 For example, Miika Tolonen notes the affinity of Stanley Hauerwas praxis-oriented 
theology and Nordic Lutheran Christianity. See Miika Tolonen, Witness is Presence. 
Reading Stanley Hauerwas in a Nordic Setting(Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2014), 4–5. 
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exposition of subjective emotions but a complex unity which joins theory and 
practice together.49  
 
As it was noted, Lutherans have never been very interested in the natural 
theology in Aristotelian sense. Instead for Lutherans, the proof is in the 
pudding. The preacher of the Gospel does not try to convince his listeners 
with the help of neutral proofs but by means of the Law and Gospel, which 
address the self-understanding of the person as an agent who lives his or her 
life in the tension of perfect ideal and suboptimal performance.50  
 
Moreover, the social aspect has always been central to Lutheran reformation. 
The focus in renewing the life of the church was not limited to just doctrinal 
issues but to the life of society in general. In fact, the difference between 
“dogmatics” and “ethics” would have been for this reason unthinkable for 
Luther. The doctrine of mercy addresses our ethical shortcomings, and ethical 




The notion of “giving” has been one of the recurring themes in postmodern 
philosophy and theology.52 In the postmodern debate, the point of departure 
has been Nietzsche’s account of giving as a way to establish a power relation 
through economic change and consequent dependence. 
 
Derrida goes to the other extreme and tries to depict “pure gift” as an 
inherently disinterested act. Because “normal” giving always establishes a 
structure of power, Derrida goes after something else. In the end, the pure gift 
is a gift given by nobody to nobody in particular without any particular 
intention.53 Translated into theological language, a form of giving would be 
an act that has no ifs attached to it. 
 
Lutherans typically cherish the idea of God’s free, unconditional and 
universal love.54 But how does it compare with the idea of Derridean giving? 
                                                             
49 George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine. Religion and Theology in a Postliberal 
Age (Louisville, KN: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009). 
50 This tendency is well depicted in Adolf Koeberle, The Quest for Holiness. A Biblical, 
Historical and Systematic Investigation. Transl. by John C. Mattes (Minneapolis: 
Augsburg Publishing House, 1938). According to Koeberle, the human condition can 
summarized with the help of following observations. In order for a deed to be 
genuinely good, it needs to proceed from pure motives. However, our motives are 
usually corrupt, and moreover, we are unable to atone our wrongdoings, to change 
our past, and reasonably believe that we can perform any better in the future. 
51 Antti Raunio, Summe des christlichen Lebens: Die “Goldene Regel” als Gesetz der Liebe 
in der Theologie Martin Luthers von 1510—1527 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2001). 
52 John Caputo & Michael Scanlon, God, Gift, and Postmodernism (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1999). 
Risto Saarinen, God and the Gift: Ecumenical Theology of Giving (Collegeville: Liturgical 
Press, 2005). 
53 For example, Jacques Derrida, Given Time 1: Counterfeit Money (Chicago: University 
of Chicago, 1992). 
54 One doctrinal point of departure from the medieval Catholicism was the heavy 
critique of the nominalist concept of merit, which functioned as the basis for 
justification. Instead, the person is justified without any preceding merits. 
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A standard analysis of giving includes four elements: the giver, the gift, the 
recipient, and the beneficiary. Observing these elements, we easily see that 
the gift exchange always involves a personal element. I cannot give a book to 
a bookshelf, and I cannot receive a gift from a bookshelf. 
 
In the case of Christian faith, not only the giver and the recipient are personal, 
but the gift and the beneficiaries are also personal. In fact, we could say that 
only giving and receiving makes us persons in the first place. Moreover, in 
some Trinitarian models, we could even say that God is the giver, the gift, the 
recipient, and the beneficiary, all in one. 
 
In contrast, the attempts of several postmodern thinkers to resist modernity 
and its reading of the world only reiterate the modern violence in a new form. 
The basic problem in both of these ways is to keep the person in the picture. In 
the Nietzschean case, the person has only instrumental value. In the 
Derridean case, the personhood disappears altogether.55  
 
Luther explains in his Commentary on Galatians how when the sinner looks at 
Christ, the sinner receives the form of Christ, or that his or her faith 
is formed by Christ.56 Here the language of gift is central: Christ gives himself 
to the one who believes. Luther opposed the idea that the sinner receives only 
a new state of mind that enables her to perform better. The thing that gives 
form to the faith is not the person’s own active love, or an idea about Christ, 
but Christ himself, who is Love personified. This means that we are made one 
with a person who is Love, not just with an idea about a person or something 
that refers to the person. And this should have some bearing on how we see 
ourselves and who we are, and how we relate to ourselves and the others 
around us. 
 
A gift can be given only in the context of personhood and desire. A gift is a 
gift only if I am interested in the person to whom I give something and with 
whom I want to establish a relationship. Nietzsche and his allies may object 
that I am only seeking to establish a power relation, but why should I believe 
them? Why should I think that giving exposes the primordial will to power 
rather than the even more primordial will to love, to sacrifice one’s own self 
and thereby establish a relationship where gifts are given and received 
without the fear of debt? 
 
Contrariwise, the endless circle of critique should follow from post-
Nietzschean notions of the gift, which are ultimately unable to guarantee the 
reality of love and existence of real personhood. From the Lutheran 
                                                             
55 Along these lines, David Bentley Hart has argued that the Derridean notion “so 
exaggerates the selflessness of divine love as effectively to evacuate the image of God 
of all those qualities of delight, desire, jealousy, and regard that Scripture ascribes to 
him. Such a separation of loves receives perhaps its appropriate parody in the image 
of an endless and disinterested outpouring of nothing toward nothingness. But in 
what sense, precisely, is an agape purified of eros distinquishable from hate? Or utter 
indifference? …Would there not be something demonic in a love without 
enchantment, without a desire for the other, a longing to dwell with and be 
recognized by the other?” David B. Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2003), 264. 
56 WA 40 I, 228–229. 
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viewpoint, the postmodern notions of giving appear too monolithic, too 
interested in just one particular good.57 Granted, Lutheran theology may also 
appear as monomaniac in its tendency to safeguard the idea of sola gratia. If 
the idea of grace is divorced from the personhood of believer and the 
personhood of Trinitarian giver, this can lead to obsessive preoccupation with 





I think it has been sufficiently clear that I do not think that Lutheran theology 
can be taken simply as a pious form of postmodern philosophy.58 There are 
clear philosophical, and theological, differences.  Yet Lutheran thinking is 
obviously more postmodern than modern – if we mean by ‘postmodern’ the 
weaker version of postmodernism.59 Lutheran thinking contains elements that 
make it hard to combine with scientific modes of rationality and consequently 
push it towards more romantic, subjectivistic and existentialist modes of 
thought. 
 
It is perhaps not a coincidence that Friedrich Nietzsche, Friedrich Jacob 
Jacobi, Johan Georg Hamann, Sören Kierkegaard and all the big names of 
existentialist religion from Friedrich Schleiermacher to Rudolf Bultmann, 
Martin Heidegger (yes, he was a Catholic, but heavily influenced by Luther) 
and Paul Tillich and have been Lutheran. 
 
One might suppose that if Lutheran theology is so nicely resonant with 
postmodern sensibilities it should have enjoyed remarkable success in the 
contemporary Western world. However, this has not been the case. Lutherans 
in the West suffer from the same problems as every other mainline Protestant 
denomination: brain-drain, rapid decline of active members and severe 
financial problems. 
 
Moreover, the particularly Lutheran ways of doing theology do not seem to 
be at the cutting edge of theological enquiry. They either draw attention of a 
small sphere of scholars (who are typically either very liberal or very 
conservative) or they are already geared towards ecumenical Christianity so 
that the Lutheran part appears as an ingredient that does not have a major 
role in the end product (I am thinking, for example, of the systematic 
theologies of Robert W. Jenson and Wolfhart Pannenberg). 
 
                                                             
57 Smith (Jacques Derrida, 72) argues that Derrida’s notions of justice ends up in 
contradiction because it is unable to reconcile the pure ideal with the reality of 
earthly society. 
58 Some forms of postmodern thinking (even those who appear as atheistic) can be 
regarded as properly religious. See, e.g., Bruce Ellis Benson, Pious Nietzsche. 
Decadence and Dionysian Faith (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007). 
59 J.G. Hamann eccentric philosophical theology is perhaps worth mentioning here. 
Hamann was a contemporary and friend of Kant, who offered an alternative to 
Kant’s philosophy based on Lutheran theology of language as the mediator between 
the world and us. In a way, Hamann was a postmodern thinker long before the 
postmodern turn.  Oswald Bayer, A Contemporary in Dissent. J.G. Hamann as a Radical 
Enlightener (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012); John Betz, After Enlightenment. The Post-
Secural Vision of J.G. Hamann (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008). 
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Pannenberg himself quipped some time ago that Lutheranism would quite 
likely sink into oblivion within next five decades. He might be right. 
Mainstream Lutheran church bodies do not show signs that could warrant 
positive predictions about their chances of survival in the long run, and non-
mainstream Lutherans (who are not losing members as fast) do not seem to 
gather large masses in the Western world even if some of these communities 
are growing. 
 
If Lutheranism survives somewhere in the form that is going to have a larger 
influence in the society, it will be in the Global South.60 But at this point we 
have no clear picture of what kind of Lutheran theology the South will 
produce and who will be their main dialogue partners in philosophy and in 
other Christian communities. 
                                                             
60 Perhaps it is the parts in “postmodern Lutheranism” that are pre-modern that give 
it the mileage it has. By pre-modern, I mean understanding philosophy as a way of 
wisdom and as a practical guide for living righteously. This would enable 
flourishing of Lutheran communities in contexts where these issues are still on the 
table. 
